Climate finance and the World Bank

Does the World Bank bear any responsibility in the flood at Mokwa, Nigeria ?

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The town of Mokwa (9.2948° N; 5.0547° E) is the administrative headquarters of Mokwa Local Government Area (LGA) in Niger State, Nigeria. A flood beginning early in the morning of May 29, 2025 after heavy rainfall is reported to have killed more than 150 people, and perhaps many more, in and around Mokwa (link: https://apnews.com/article/nigeria-floods-mokwa-c29db671f8b92972d8800a82adb2cd97). Some 500 households appear to have been affected in a town with a projected population of some 410,000 people.[1] Beyond the human losses, the waters destroyed markets, bridges, and roads.

This post asks if the World Bank’s failure to respect its own environmental and social safeguards contributed to the deaths and losses caused in Mokwa by the recent flood. I first describe the Bank’s role in a recently closed national flood control operation, using material from an earlier post (https://johnmcintire.substack.com/p/climate-finance-and-the-world-bank-de8?r=lxiat) in answering this question.

The Nigeria Soil Erosion and Watershed Management project

The World Bank approved an IDA Credit of US$500 million to Nigeria for a Soil Erosion and Watershed Management project (NEWMAP) on May 8, 2012. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) gave a grant of US$3.96 million and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) gave a second grant of US$4.63 million. IDA gave an additional credit of US$300 million on June 27, 2018, accompanied by a grant of US$100 million. The project closed on June 30, 2022. Nigeria supplemented World Bank and GEF/SCCF money with an estimated US$56 million in national funding. NEWMAP was a large project; IDA exposure to Nigeria was US$17.1 billion in September 2024 , making the IDA commitment of US$0.9 billion to NEWMAP alone about 5.3% of IDA’s exposure to Nigeria and perhaps 0.4 % of global IDA exposure.

The Project Appraisal Document (PAD, Report No: 67983-NG) stated that the project would generate benefits by building erosion control and watershed management structures and by strengthening local institutions in watershed management. While the PAD declared--“The objective of the Erosion and Watershed Management Project for Nigeria is to reduce vulnerability to soil erosion in targeted sub-watersheds” (p. 5)--my review of NEWMAP found that the operation’s data were not credible for estimating economic, climate adaptation, and local biophysical impacts of the project.[2] The PAD was ambitious, stating: "The total number of primary beneficiaries at the onset of the project will reach about 2.2 million people and will gradually increase to about 2.6 million in 2020 and about 4.2 million in 2042 " (PAD: p. 6).

The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF, September 2011) done for NEWMAP covered the seven original states (Abia, Anambra, Cross River, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu and Imo) of the operation. The ESMF sought to "ensure that implementation of NEWMAP (the project) meets with the existing EIA law in Nigeria and World Bank safeguards policies". The Framework identified potential environmental impacts as: less erosion, less flooding, rehabilitation of degraded lands, increase of vegetative cover, conservation of biodiversity, and fewer disaster risks at project sites, notably those posed by landslides and floods. NEWMAP triggered WB safeguard policies in environmental assessment, natural habitats, pest management, physical cultural resources, involuntary resettlement, forests, and dam safety.[3]

What did NEWMAP achieve ?

The World Bank Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for NEWMAP (Report No: ICR00005460 of July 19, 2023) found that the operation had reached some of its targets despite delays in civil works (the main component). The ICR stated that the operation’s core element of watershed management treated 30,628 hectares with erosion control measures, notably structures to arrest flooding and soil erosion. The operation reportedly covered 103 sites in 20 states. Roughly 1.83 million people were said to have benefited from investments and related advisory services. The ICR rated the project “Satisfactory”, Bank performance as “Satisfactory”, and M& E quality as “Substantial” with some mild hesitation about sustainability. There were no complaints to the Inspection Panel. All grievances received under the project were resolved. The 21 state resettlement action plans (RAPs) had been completed at mid-2023 (ICR: pp. 27-28).

Data from the 30,628 hectares treated under NEWMAP ought to comprise: (1) details of the geo-referenced sites; (2) maps of the works done, showing treatments (tree planting, check dams, erosion control terraces, protection of houses and businesses) and; (3) costs of works in enough detail to allow calculation of costs per hectare and per beneficiary. I could not find the geo-referenced site data and Bank staff admitted to me that such data do not exist. Neither the PAD (P124905) nor the ICR has a quantitative annex nor a link to the geo-referenced data. The 20 disclosed supervision reports do not show adequate site information. The project's mid-term reviews do not show location data and project contracts are not available in enough detail to extract local evidence. The main (Abuja) office of NEWMAP (9.03 N, 7.52 E) has no website, nor do the NEWMAP offices at Calabar in Cross River state, or at New Owerri in Imo state, or at Umuahia in Abia state. The link to the Nigeria Federal Ministry of the Environment (main site is https://environment.gov.ng/#) gives the main Ministry website. The link to the Erosion and Watershed Management Project (https://newmap.gov.ng/) gives only the message “Maintenance mode is on” and has done so at least since mid-October of 2024.

Were World Bank funds committed in Mokwa under NEWMAP ?

The short answer is — it is not clear. Project documents do not show that WB funds or national counterpart resources were committed specifically to Mokwa.

The long answer is — “Mokwa had serious flood and erosion risks, making it a logical site for NEWMAP”, as follows.

a. Mokwa is near the Niger River and the Jebba dam, where flood risks were identified in the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) prepared for the project;

b. The 20th (and final) ISR for NEWMAP (archived June 29, 2022; ISRR 51134) mentions that “Improved erosion risk mapping has been carried out in 19 States [including Niger state]”;

c. The 18th WB ISR (June 29, 2021; ISR46995) mentioned that 4 hydromet stations were “ongoing” in Niger state, but no further information about those stations could be found; and

d. A press account (https://thesourceng.com/gully-erosion-world-bank-gives-niger-govt-10m/#google_vignette, December 7, 2024) reported that “The Niger State Government has secured a $10 million World Bank-assisted fund to combat gully erosion in parts of Mokwa Local Government Area”, citing a statement from the office of the Governor of Niger State, following a tour by the state officials. The Governor’s Office remarked at the time: “The World Bank has been working with the Nigerian government to implement the Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP), which aims to reduce vulnerability to soil erosion in targeted sub-watersheds.”

What should the Bank do ?

Even if the Bank had no direct role in financing flood control and soil erosion works in Mokwa LGA, the scope of the disaster [4] and the nature of the Bank’s long-term support for infrastructure demand a full investigation of the Bank’s role in infrastructure safeguards in Nigeria. While it is too late to present a request for investigation to the Bank’s Inspection Panel (NEWMAP is closed), Bank management should commission a full inquiry by IEG into the Bank’s role, if any, in the Mokwa catastrophe. Such an inquiry should include publication of any heretofore undisclosed project information—supervision reports, aides-memoires, contracts, environmental and social reports, grievance reports, details of resettlement payments, geo-referenced site data—on NEWMAP. If the Bank did finance any such works, technical assistance, or resettlement compensation under NEWMAP, then, as explained in the PAD, Bank staff would have been required to comply with relevant safeguards, notably environmental assessment, involuntary resettlement, and dam safety; internal Bank messages on these subjects should be disclosed as well.

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[1]. The most recent Nigerian census was in 2006; it found the country’s population to be 140.4 million of which Mokwa contributed about 245,000. A rough projection of Nigeria’s total population in mid-2025 is 234.6 million, allowing a projection of Mokwa’s population to be 410,000 (that is, 245,000* (234.6/140.4).

[2]. The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, in an Implementation Completion Report Review (ICRR), concluded that NEWMAP showed “Insufficient evidence of outcomes achieved” (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099111023175535521/pdf/P1249050d5b8430740a3b60f9a7c516282f.pdf)

[3]. Bank documentation on NEWMAP is inconsistent on the applicable safeguards. The Project Information Document of May 27, 2012 states that the project would trigger safeguards on environmental assessment, physical cultural resources, involuntary resettlement, and international waterways (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/192731468775784816/pdf/PID0Appraisal0007201201336419466836.pdf). The PAD (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/728741468334143813/pdf/679830PAD0P1240osed0401901200simult.pdf) mentions environmental assessment, natural habitats, forests, pest management, physical cultural resources, involuntary resettlement, dam safety, and international waters.

[4] The Mokwa flood is not the first in Nigeria. The collapse of the Alau dam in Borno State in September 2024 is believed to have killed more than 150 people and to have displaced more than 419,000. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alau_Dam).