What is the IMF doing in Argentina in 2026 ?

I earlier wrote^[1] that the Fund had abandoned its global responsibilities in Argentina and had become, even more than it has been in the past, the servant of the US Treasury. This is not a novel finding; indeed, recycling failed programs under orders from larger shareholders is a generic feature of the Fund’s work in Argentina and in such other dependencies as Egypt, Pakistan, Senegal, and Zambia. The Fund, as one may imagine, sees things differently and has recently congratulated Javier Milei for his efforts to cut inflation to single digits while not, of course, saying much else about the country’s economy. This post reviews briefly what the Fund is doing, or not, in Argentina since the approval of its current program.

The 2025-26 Fund program

Argentina began 2025 with about US$60 billion in debt to the IMF, making it the largest borrower. Despite the success of the Milei regime^[2] in cutting inflation from some 15 % per month in the first quarter of 2024 to about 2.9% in the first two months of 2026, Argentina encountered an exchange crisis in early 2025, obliging the country to borrow another US$20 billion from the Fund in April 2025 (of which US$12 billion was disbursed immediately). A further liquidity problem ensued in September 2025, when Argentina was forced to beg for US$20 billion from the US Treasury on terms that have never been fully explained.^[3] Some of the US$ 20 billion was used to pay Argentina’s short-term obligations to the Fund in late 2025 and again in early 2026. Argentina announced early in 2026 that it had closed the $20 billion swap with the US Treasury but we do not know how much of the principal was used, how much is outstanding to the Treasury, or what the costs of the arrangement were to Argentina.

The Fund 2025 program is in an amount of US$ 20 billion, of which, as I noted, US$12 billion was disbursed in April 2025. A second tranche was to have been disbursed after the Second Review of the Program somewhere between December 2025 and January 2026. (The US Treasury did pay US$808 million SDRs to service an Argentine obligation to the Fund in February). The key performance criterion (PC) at risk in Q4 of 2025 and Q1 of 2026 is that of net international reserves; that PC got a waiver in the First Review of 2025 and its targets were lowered for later Reviews.

Why is the Fund program now delayed ?

“We ain’t burning no Lemon Street chumps here” — The Wire

While the Fund announced a “technical mission”^[4] to Buenos Aires in late January 2026, there has been no Second Review and no official communication about the delayed Review or what might be causing the delay. the BA Herald cited Fund sources on 13 February 2026 claiming “significant progress” in the technical mission. Fund flack Julie Kozack (USA), in a press briefing of 19 February 2026, referred to the authorities’ price stabilization since early 2024 as “impressive”. We do know that the head of Argentina’s national statistical agency resigned in February but^[5] it would be highly improper for you, dear readers, to infer that this departure had anything to do with any alleged national accounts problems in completing the Fund’s Second Review.

What is most probable is that the Second Review, and its associated Fund disbursement are late, because Argentina encountered unusual difficulties in manipulating its accounts to the satisfaction of Fund staff. The glitch appears to be the performance criterion for net central bank reserve. This had not been met as of March 25, 2026. Indeed, in the period from February 2025 through February 2026, the gross reserves in the BCRA only rose from US$28.7 billion to US$45.5 billion; in other words, most of the 2025 increase in gross reserves was the Fund disbursement of US$12 billion on 15 April.

What next ?

Argentina owes US$57.3 billion in total to the Fund. While Argentina’s 2026 obligations to the Fund are modest, the country owes some US$20 billion in 2026 to its external creditors, bilateral and commercial. Its real exchange rate has been rising a matter of policy given Milei’s refusal to allow the peso to float^[6], making it more difficult to reconstitute reserves from higher net exports and discouraging new foreign investments as the peso continues to be overvalued.

At some point, the Fund’s American Bulgarian Managing Director will abandon the performance criteria on net reserves (which was already modified in the First Review), give the necessary waiver, make the 2026 disbursement and fabricate some story for her Board, a domain in which she has vast experience. The war on Iran will provide a convenient pretext about rising import bills, “global uncertainty”, “protecting the poor against high fuel prices”^[7], usw, and life will go on, at least for those who can afford it as winter approaches in BA.

What is surely next in 2026 is that Argentina confronts heavy foreign debt service that it will have trouble paying. What will it do then ? The country is tapped out with the Fund. The potential for asset stripping appears less rich than it did last fall. Milei will turn again to the Americans at which point the Argentine caudillo will face the wisdom of Norman Mailer, cited above—the US, already insolvent and getting more so by the day, will be unable to help him and indeed the US courts will again become Argentina’s major adversary.

Que lastima !

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[1]. https://johnmcintire.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/176775266?referrer=%2Fpublish%2Fposts%2Fpublished; and https://johnmcintire.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/178325767?referrer=%2Fpublish%2Fposts%2Fpublished

[2]. Javier Milei became President of Argentina on 10 December 2023.

[3]. The first US$20 billion was a US Treasury swap with the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA). A second US$ 20 billion was widely reported as forthcoming from the US private sector. This seems not to have materialized. Or maybe it went to Venezuela.

[4]. I assume that the Fund people use “technical mission” in place of “Second Review” to avoid a legal requirement to report to their Board on the failure of the Second Review (which legally has never taken place).

[5]. https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/economy/head-of-indec-national-statistics-bureau-resigns-post.phtml

[6]. A “matter of policy” because the government’s nominal adjustment of the peso peg is less than the rate of inflation.

[7]. Energy subsidies are significant in Argentina.