Why is Ajay Banga still President of the World Bank ?

Ajay Banga was an odd choice to lead the World Bank though he did fit the usual pattern of an uninformed pick made by the Americans because they were too lazy to think about what the job is and how to do it. US pro football teams spend hundreds of millions each year on picking quarterbacks and wide receivers, yet the US administration cannot be bothered to reflect more than a few hours about the person who will manage the world’s largest development bank; knowing the strictly hierarchical anthropology of US administrations, red or blue, I assure you that there was no internal debate about choosing Banga just as there was none about picking his predecessors, at least going back to Jim Wolfensohn in 1994/95.

I expressed misgivings about Banga in previous Substacks, notably that he was too rich to be the Bank’s President. Wealth as such is not a disqualification for the Bank’s leadership but being wealthy is, in that plutocrats spend too much time listening to other plutocrats, a fact that creates a certain bias in how the moneyed classes view things.[1] I wrote the following two years ago about Banga’s career as a moneylender (he is an ex-CEO of Mastercard) and what that experience meant for his tenure at the Bank:

“… AB starts from the perspective of the hard-headed businessman. The hard-headed businessman (HHBM) is as badly adapted to the World Bank as it is badly adapted to political office. A businessman can fire clients who don’t pay and can sack staff who don’t deliver. The President of the US cannot fire Texas … The President of the WB cannot fire Guinea-Bissau, to take a small example, and cannot fire Argentina, to take a big one, though he will be sorely tempted with both. “

I assumed in 2023 that Banga, soon having become bored with his pathetic compensation and with the fussy micromanagement of Scott Bessant, would hang around for two or three years and then resign to visit his money someplace nice. But, alas, he is not only staying at the Bank he is working overtime to ingratiate himself with the Trump regime, notably in moving to climate denialism and in accommodating Trumpian interests. The Bank has survived worse CEOs than Banga—he knows what “LIBOR” is, he has not been shagging the help behaving inappropriately with subordinates and his climate denialism is, so far, more passive than active—but the man has now done something that should lead to his immediate dismissal, which I discuss in this post.

What is the World Bank doing in the Board of Peace ?

The Board of Peace (BoP) was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (November 2025) and announced at Davos in January 2026. The BoP’s Charter gives it a broad mandate for conflict zones globally—with Gaza as its immediate focus — but does not mention the Palestinian Authority or the Palestinian people. The BoP’s nine-member Executive Board is chaired for life by Trump and includes Marco Rubio, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Tony Blair, Nickolay Mladenov, Robert Gabriel, Marc Rowan, and Ajay Banga.⁷

The Gaza trust fund

The Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) for Gaza Reconstruction and Development (GRAD) was established in November 2025 after some obscure consultation with the Trump administration. The World Bank serves as “limited trustee” of the FIF—a role that departs from its function in comparable trust funds (Ukraine, Haiti) where the Bank retains full fiduciary accountability throughout the fund’s life. The trustee agreement between the World Bank and the Board of Peace defining the conditions for fund management has not been published.

The GRAD establishment document declares that the Bank bears “no responsibility or accountability, fiduciary or otherwise, for the use of funds after transfer.” [2] This statement is incompatible with the World Bank’s usual FIF Trustee framework, under which the Bank normally provides financial and fiduciary services including “accounting, reporting, financial and fiduciary management, and adherence to established procedures and internal controls.” [3] The limited trustee structure strips these safeguards once the FIF is endowed. As of April 7, 2026, the sole confirmed transfer to GRAD was US$1.25 billion from the US State Department, reprogrammed from US disaster and peacekeeping funds on March 26, 2026. ^[4]

Ajay Banga’s dual roles

Banga has two positions in the BoP structure: (1) personal member of the BoP Executive Board, and (2) head of the World Bank, the institution serving as limited trustee of the Financial Intermediary Fund for Gaza Reconstruction and Development. These roles create conflicts of interest that can only be resolved by Banga’s resigning from the BoP or from the Bank.

Banga has publicly characterized his BoP membership as separate from his World Bank responsibilities, describing political leaders as “deciders” and the Bank as “worker bees.”¹⁵ A senior Bank official quoted anonymously by Devex offered a different view: “Banga handed over that credibility without conditions.”[5] The founding BoP resolution identifies Banga without his World Bank title, which, if intended to establish a “personal capacity” distinction, raises its own questions about Board of Executive Directors authorization and Banga’s personal fiduciary exposure to the BoP.

The case against Ajay Banga

World Bank Group President Ajay Banga has engaged in conduct that: (a) violates the IBRD Articles of Agreement[6]; (b) constitutes an undisclosed conflict of interest under Bank rules; and (c) establishes a fund that departs from the Bank’s agreed operational policies in ways that harm the affected populations, notably by violating Bank safeguards on consultation and involuntary resettlement.

The Bank’s Article IV §10 prohibits political activity

Ajay Banga, in a letter of November 2025, to the US National Security Advisor, lobbied for the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2803 establishing the Board of Peace.[7] This letter constitutes political activity by a Bank officer that exceeds technical or operational engagement and is outside the bounds of the Bank’s non-political mandate.

Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement[8] states:

“The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially.”

In November 2025—before UNSC Resolution 2803 had been adopted—Banga wrote to the US administration endorsing the draft resolution.² This letter constitutes lobbying by Banga for a geopolitical instrument that would create a new international body of which he would personally become a member. This exceeds the “technical advisory” framing that Banga has since offered. Reuters has reported the letter though its full text has not been made public. The “technical advisory” argument from Banga is particularly funny given that the GRAD TF agreement specifies that Trump is chairman for life.

The Bank’s Article V §5(b) restricts personal roles of Bank staff

Ajay Banga assumed personal membership on the BoP Board without authorization from the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. The founding BoP resolution identifies Banga without reference to his World Bank title, suggesting a personal rather than an institutional capacity—an arrangement the Bank’s Board has not approved. [9]

Article V, Section 5 of the IBRD Articles vests general oversight authority in the Board of Executive Directors over all material decisions by the President acting on behalf of the institution. No public record has been located of any Board resolution, decision, or minute authorizing President Banga’s membership on the Board of Peace Executive Board — whether as an institutional or personal matter.

The absence of recorded authorization is compounded by the “personal capacity” framing: if the BoP resolution identifies Banga without his World Bank title, the Board may have been bypassed entirely. This creates twin risks: (a) Banga may have created personal legal obligations—including potential fiduciary duties to the BoP—without the Board’s knowledge; and (b) the Bank’s institutional credibility is implicated in a body it did not formally approve.

The complainant requests that the Board of Executive Directors formally confirm or deny whether any authorization was sought or granted, and if not, what corrective steps are appropriate.

A possible undisclosed conflict of interest

Marc Rowan is co-founder and CEO of Apollo Global Management, a fund with some $700 billion in assets under management.[10] At the BoP’s inaugural meeting in February 2026, Rowan publicly stated that Gaza’s coastline was worth “$50 billion on a conservative basis.” Within the BoP Executive Board structure, Rowan’s portfolio specifically covers “reconstruction, investment attraction, large-scale funding, and capital mobilization.”

The World Bank’s stated function in GRAD is to “de-risk private investment in Gaza reconstruction”—a function that would appear to benefit Apollo and its investors, given Apollo’s scale and Rowan’s public statements about the commercial value of the Gaza coastline.[11]

Ajay Banga, as head of the institution providing de-risking services—in English, “de-risking” means “preferential finance to friends of the lender”—sits on the same executive body as the CEO of the firm most positioned to benefit from de-risking. There is no recusal mechanism, no dispute resolution clause, or disclosure framework in the BoP governance structure. The Bank’s staff rules and the IBRD Articles require disclosure and active management of conflicts of interest by senior officials, including the President. Even if there were some sort of ex-post waiver about Banga’s role—it is impossible to overestimate the bovine passivity of the Bank’s Board—it would be meaningless.

The Apollo conflict warrants more detailed treatment because it is the one most immediately actionable through the Bank’s grievance resolution mechanisms.

This is the BoP transaction structure: The World Bank, under President Banga’s leadership, establishes a fund (GRAD) whose purpose includes de-risking private investment in Gaza reconstruction. Private investment in Gaza land and infrastructure is what Rowan has said that Apollo will pursue, noting again his remark that US$50 billion is a “conservative” valuation. Rowan sits with Banga on the BoP board that oversees this investment process. The de-risking function, of which the Bank makes so much is not incidental to Apollo’s interests; it is a public-sector subsidy to that company’s investors.

The Apollo conflict is not hypothetical. The $50 billion valuation of property belonging to other people was made at a meeting in which Banga may have participated. Even if Banga was not present at the BoP meeting, and even if he somehow recused himself ex-post from GRAD discussions, the institutional conflict for the Bank remains.

Failure to consider an opinion of the International Court of Justice

Article V, Section 8(b) of the Articles of Agreement requires that the Bank give “due weight” to the decisions of competent international bodies. The Bank committed to GRAD and President Banga assumed his BoP board role apparently without the Bank having given “due weight” to the ICJ’s July 19, 2024, advisory opinion on the illegality of Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory[12].

The ICJ’s advisory opinion of July 19, 2024, found that Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory—including Gaza—is unlawful under international law, and that states and international organizations have obligations not to render aid or assistance that maintains that unlawful situation. The Bank’s commitment to GRAD and President Banga’s assumption of his BoP board role both occurred after the ICJ opinion was published. No public record has been identified of any formal Bank assessment of whether the GRAD structure and BoP board role are consistent with the Bank’s obligations under Article V §8(b) considering the ICJ opinion, or whether legal advice on this point was sought from the General Counsel [13].

GRAD trust fund established without compliance with Bank policies

GRAD was established under a “limited trustee” structure in which the Bank explicitly waived fiduciary responsibility after transfer of funds. This limited trustee structure was adopted without the assessment of public compliance which is required under Bank Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) or OP/BP 2.30 (Projects in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations). It is a structure that excludes the Palestinian Authority from governance and even from the most basic consultation about the operations of the trust fund of which they are, in theory, the beneficiaries.

The Bank has ignored at least two of its operational policies.

OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). Nearly all of Gaza’s population has been displaced since October 2023. Any reconstruction program affecting resettlement, land use, property, and the right of return engages OP 4.12. The limited trustee structure denies the Bank’s obligation to ensure OP 4.12 compliance in the use of funds. No public assessment under OP 4.12 has been disclosed.⁵

OP/BP 2.30 (Development Cooperation and Conflict): This policy requires a conflict-sensitivity assessment before Bank engagement in fragile or conflict-affected situations. Gaza is such a situation. No OP/BP 2.30 assessment has been made for the GRAD trust fund.

The legal document governing GRAD—the trustee agreement between the World Bank and the Board of Peace defining conditions for fund transfer—has not been disclosed. Non-disclosure of the document is itself is a violation of Bank policies.

The Bank’s Code of Professional Ethics requires senior officials to avoid situations where their interests—or the interests of parties with whom they have a close professional relationship —conflict with their institutional duties. The Ethics and Internal Justice Services Vice Presidency exists to assess such conflicts. There is no public record that it has been asked to do so here.

Civil society organizations, researchers, and US legislators have raised concerns about the incompatibility of BoP governance— which combines private investors, political operatives, and a multilateral institution in a single executive body without conflict management protocols — with the Bank’s mandate and Articles of Agreement[14].

What is to be done ?

The Bank’s Board of Executive Directors must investigate Banga’s role in the Board of Peace. This review must be supervised by the Audit Committee of the Board and carried out by the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT).[15] Where the subject of a complaint is the President of the WBG, that line of complaint is blocked as is known from the 2007 case against disgraced war criminal Paul Wolfowitz. The Audit Committee of the Board can exercise independent oversight of INT and is therefore the appropriate body to supervise such an investigation.

The investigation must begin by determining: (a) whether President Banga disclosed his co-membership with Rowan to the Bank’s General Counsel or to the Bank’s Board before assuming his BoP role; (b) whether any waiver or conflict management plan was put in place; and (c) whether Banga holds, or may hold, any personal financial interests — direct or indirect — in entities that might benefit from Gaza reconstruction; and (d) whether any personal financial interests of Ajay Banga, or interests of those in relationship with him, may benefit from the GRAD de-risking function.

The investigation must further determine if: (a) the Banga letter of November 2025 constitutes a breach of Article IV §10; (b) Banga’s personal BoP board membership was authorized by the Board of Executive Directors; and (c) Banga sought any legal opinion from the Bank’s General Counsel regarding his compliance obligations before sending the letter.

Investigation of GRAD Policy Compliance

The independent investigation must further determine: (a) whether the Bank’s role in the establishment of GRAD complied with OP 4.12 and OP/BP 2.30; (b) whether the limited trustee structure of GRAD is consistent with the IBRD Articles of Agreement; (c) whether the ICJ advisory opinion of July 2024 was given “due weight” as required under Article V §8(b); and (d) whether the Palestinian Authority’s exclusion from GRAD governance is consistent with the Bank’s own multi-donor fund precedents.

Disclosure of the Unpublished Trustee Agreement

The Board of Executive Directors must direct the immediate full public disclosure of the trustee agreement between the World Bank and the Board of Peace governing GRAD fund transfers. This document is material to any assessment of the Bank’s compliance with its Articles and policies, and its continued non-disclosure is inconsistent with the Bank’s transparency commitments.

Interim arrangements pending investigation

Pending the outcome of the above investigations, the Board of Executive Directors must request that President Banga resign from participation in Board of Peace executive meetings and from GRAD-related decisions at the World Bank, consistent with standard practice when a senior official is under investigation for conflicts of interest.

What can be done outside the Bank ?

Ethics complaints about Bank staff may be filed by: (a) any Executive Director of the IBRD acting in their individual or representative capacity[16]; (b) a civil society organization with documented standing; (c) a World Bank Group staff member submitting through internal ethical channels; or (d) two or more persons adversely affected in the territory in question (Gaza), in which case an additional Inspection Panel request may be warranted under the 2025 Accountability Mechanism.

Implications for the next President of the WBG

Banga should go this week but that is improbable. Nor will Banga do the right thing and respect the Bank’s legal and operational standards. (He knows what would happen). Failing action about Banga’s conflicts of interest, the Bank’s stakeholders will probably have to live with him for the remaining two years of his term. If Banga does manage to hang on for another 24 months, the CGD has given good reasons why his contract must not be renewed [17] and I have proposed a new mechanism to choose the Bank’s next President (Substack of April 13, 2024; https://johnmcintire.substack.com/p/choosing-the-ceo-of-the-world-bank)

Before April 2028, however, there is a subtler problem that the Bank’s Board must solve--What if Banga leaves suddenly before the end of his term ? It is more likely that he will leave abruptly because the Trump regime wants him gone than because of some investigation by the Bank’s Board. There is a chance that Trump and Bessent will dump Banga, as they did Kristy Noem and Pam Bondi, to appoint someone more malleable, someone without Banga’s baggage who could quickly “legalize” what GRAD is doing in Gaza and, moreover, someone with close ties to the US administration who would support the Americans’ preferred candidate in the Brasilian presidential elections in October, 2026. (That candidate is not Lula da Silva, in case anyone asks). The Bank’s Board knows of internal candidates who are not bolsonaristas and should turn to them as interim Presidents if Banga suddenly decides to spend more time with his family.

The next President of the World Bank Group, as I have written more than once, must be a woman and cannot be an American.

[1] Banga has complained in public about his Bank salary.

[2] World Bank, GRAD Establishment Document, November 2025. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099112125105517915/pdf/BOSIB-d55fb765-9bc7-4312-941a-3e1eb65b556e.pdf

[3] World Bank FIF Trustee Overview: “They are independently governed, with the World Bank Group holding no decision-making authority.” https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/overview

[4] Semafor, “State Department sends $1.25B in foreign aid to Board of Peace,” March 26, 2026. https://www.semafor.com/article/03/26/2026/state-department-sends-125b-in-foreign-aid-to-board-of-peace

[5] Devex, “The questions around Banga’s role on Trump’s Board of Peace,” 2026. https://www.devex.com/news/devex-invested-the-questions-around-banga-s-role-on-trump-s-board-of-peace-111929.

[6] IBRD Articles of Agreement. https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement.

[7] Reuters, “World Bank letter: US backs draft UN resolution on Gaza,” November 9, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-bank-letter-us-backs-draft-un-resolution-gaza-2025-11-09/

[8] World Bank Articles of Agreement: https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/articles-of-agreement/ibrd-articles-of-agreement/article-IV.

[9] Drop Site News, “Leaked Board of Peace Resolution — Gaza, Trump, US,” 2025.

[10] Marc Rowan’s name appears in the Epstein Files.

[11]Hassan & Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Board of Peace and Funding for Gaza Reconstruction: On Whose Account?” March 2026. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/research/2026/03/the-board-of-peace-and-funding-for-gaza-reconstruction-on-whose-account. There are many links among GRAD Board members and the World Bank Private Sector Lab (see my Substack of February 27, 2024: https://open.substack.com/pub/johnmcintire/p/the-world-banks-board-should-close?r=lxiat&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web)

[12] International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, July 19, 2024. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192

[13] IBON International, “Gaza Bereft of Peace: The World Bank and Current US Security Strategy,” March 12, 2026. https://iboninternational.org/2026/03/12/gaza-bereft-of-peace-the-world-bank-and-current-us-security-strategy/

[14] Senator Markey et al., Letter to Ajay Banga re: Board of Peace, 2026. https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/board_of_peace.pdf. Accountability Counsel, “Civil Society Organizations Raise Alarm Over World Bank’s Role in Gaza,” 2026. https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/blog/civil-society-organizations-raise-alarm-over-world-banks-role-in-gaza. Action Network, “Withdraw President Banga,” Open Letter, 2026. https://actionnetwork.org/letters/withdraw-president-banga

[15] World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency (INT). https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/integrity-vice-presidency

[16] I do not know if this has happened officially. It does happen unofficially with some frequency, through efforts by Executive Directors and their flunkies to grab staff positions inside the Bank.

[17] https://www.cgdev.org/blog/world-banks-self-inflicted-crisis